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A Brexit Gentlemen’s Agreement 
Daniel Gros 
Now that the contours of the future trade relationship between the UK and the EU are gradually 
emerging, Daniel Gros reflects on what it would take for that relationship to minimise the friction 
that Brexit will inevitably generate. 
n her latest speech on Brexit, British Prime Minister Theresa May rejected the prospect that 
the United Kingdom would remain in the European Union’s customs union, on the grounds 
that the UK wants its own trade policy. This is not in the best interest of either the UK or the 
EU. 
It is true that Norway and Switzerland, both of which are highly integrated into the EU market, 
have their own customs borders with the bloc. These countries need an independent 
commercial policy to provide greater protection than the EU offers to their domestic 
agricultural sectors, which in both cases can never be efficient owing to their mountainous 
terrain. 
Yet the UK has traditionally been much less protective of its agriculture, and is thus likely after 
Brexit to pursue a commercial policy that is very similar to that of the EU. It is therefore difficult 
to see what the UK would gain from pursuing a national trade policy – especially at a time when 
the United States, under President Donald Trump, is pursuing policies (such as imposing tariffs 
on imported steel and aluminium) that show little regard for its smaller trading partners. 
The truth is that the main impediment to a post-Brexit customs union is political. As Labour 
leader Jeremy Corbyn, who supports remaining in the customs union, has emphasised, a 
country with the heft and influence of the UK cannot be viewed as merely following EU 
decisions, over which it has no influence. Yet this problem can be solved – or, rather, finessed. 
The UK’s demand to weigh in on EU decisions can and should be accommodated, with experts 
from the UK included in the committees that decide trade policy. Those experts would have no 
voting rights, but they would be able to shape decision-making. The EU already has similar 
arrangements with Iceland, Norway and Switzerland regarding matters relating to the 
Schengen Area. 
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Formal decision-making power is of course another matter. The EU’s legal structure cannot 
allow a non-member state to participate in binding decisions. This calls for something of a 
gentlemen’s agreement, with the EU pledging to take UK interests into account when making 
trade-policy decisions. 
If the UK remains in the existing EU customs union – as is foreseen for the transition period – 
rather than negotiating a new customs agreement with the EU, that gentleman’s agreement 
would also extend to new trade agreements that the EU concludes with third countries. After 
all, such agreements would apply explicitly to the EU’s entire customs territory – a term with a 
precise meaning under WTO rules. So, whatever market-access benefits they include would 
automatically apply to the UK. 
As a gesture of goodwill, the EU should also support the UK’s efforts to ‘grandfather’ its market 
access resulting from existing EU free-trade agreements and thereby avoid the need to 
renegotiate each and every deal. The legal argument would be that the EU customs territory 
has not changed, so existing EU trade agreements must continue to apply to the UK. But this 
argument could be contested, leaving UK exporters suddenly confronting tariffs and other 
trade barriers. 
European Commission officials could dismiss that as the UK’s problem. But such a response 
would run counter to the spirit of the European Council guidelines of April 2017, which call for 
a “constructive dialogue” with the UK “on a possible common approach toward third-country 
partners”. Such a constructive approach would include steps – like supporting the 
grandfathering of trade agreements – that minimise friction during the transition period. 
Remaining in the EU’s customs union would leave the UK in a much stronger position than, say, 
Turkey, which, despite having concluded an agreement to create a customs union with the EU, 
is not actually part of the bloc’s customs territory. As a result, third parties do not automatically 
have to grant Turkish exporters EU-level access to their markets. Instead, Turkey must try to 
persuade third countries with which the EU has concluded trade deals to do so. 
Turkey has generally succeeded in these efforts. But it enters such negotiations in a weak and 
somewhat awkward position, because it is required, per its agreement with the EU, to grant to 
the third country all of the concessions the EU has made, whereas the third country has no 
legal or political obligation to reciprocate. 
For the EU, agreeing to take the UK’s interests into account in future trade negotiations should 
not be viewed as a concession, because it is in the EU’s own long-term interest. After all, if the 
EU can offer de facto access to the EU and UK markets – which, together, are 20% larger than 
the EU market alone – its negotiating power is significantly strengthened. 
In this sense, keeping the UK in the EU customs union would help to preserve the EU’s global 
standing in trade. And while many in the EU, especially the European Commission, would like 
to have their cake and eat it too – i.e. keeping the UK in the customs union, while ignoring its 
interests –is simply not an option. 
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The alternatives available for the EU are either to see the UK leave its customs union or to keep 
the UK in, by making a political commitment to take British interests into account. From a long-
term perspective, the latter is preferable. 
Finally, remaining in the EU customs union would make it possible to avoid reestablishing a 
hard border between the UK and the Republic of Ireland after Brexit. Although May has agreed 
that avoiding a hard border should be part of any deal, she has offered only vague suggestions 
as to how that could actually be achieved. 
Brexit is, and will remain, a lose-lose proposition. Neither side can claim victory if its point of 
view prevails. But the losses on both sides can be reduced. To that end, keeping the UK in the 
EU customs union – by guaranteeing it an active, albeit informal role – is negotiators’ best bet. 
